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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction and Study Overview  
This PhD Dissertation project had as its objectives: (1) to develop MIASMA, a 
potentially open-source Medical Informatics Application for Systematic Microbiological 
Alerts that uses recently developed methods (e.g., from syndromic surveillance and from 
heuristic observations) to detect single-hospital outbreaks of both commonly occurring 
and rare bacterial species; (2) to deploy MIASMA in the Vanderbilt University Hospital 
(VUH) for use by the Department of Infection Control and Prevention; (3) to compare the 
alerting timeliness, positive predictive value, and sensitivity of MIASMA to current VUH 
infection control practices; and (4) to evaluate the utility of MIASMA when used to 
supplement current VUH infection control practices. 
Literature Review 
Context and Definitions 
Healthcare-associated infections present a substantial national burden, affecting 
approximately 2 million U.S. patients annually at a rate of 5.69 infections per 100 
hospital admissions.1 These infections increase patients’ lengths of stay and cause 
potentially preventable morbidity and mortality.2 Such infections can spread from 
patient-to-patient through direct contact (e.g., via skin contact, use of contaminated 
 2 
 
instruments, or contaminated injections), via aerosols, or via care providers.3 Outbreaks 
are defined as “an increase in occurrence of a complication or disease above the 
background rate.” 4 As previously noted, outbreaks can occur as the result of several 
different modes of transmission. If multiple sources within the hospital exist (e.g., 
inadequate quality control during intravenous line placement or in subsequent line 
management), different patients may acquire varying infections from independent 
sources. Alternatively, patients may be exposed to a shared source, such as contaminated 
injectable radiological contrast dye used during invasive medical imaging.5 Furthermore, 
if the infection can spread from patient-to-patient, a single infected patient can transmit 
the contagion to others who may then themselves continue the chain of transmission. 
Figure 1 illustrates these three possible mechanisms by which an infection can spread. 
When these transmissions continue to propagate, an outbreak results.  
 
Figure 1: Possible disease transmission mechanisms 
 
Abnormal infection rates that may indicate an outbreak vary widely, since 
background rates for infectious diseases can differ greatly. A single case of a rare 
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infection (such as pneumonic plague) may represent an underlying outbreak, whereas 
dozens of cases of infection with a common pathogen (such as E. coli urinary tract 
infections) may not. Outbreaks fall into two categories: clonal and non-clonal. A clonal 
outbreak occurs when progeny of a single organism spread to multiple patients. Non-
clonal outbreaks typically occur when infection control techniques are suboptimal (e.g., 
improper hand washing). The resulting infections involve higher than usual rates of many 
different bacterial species. Non-clonal outbreaks are identifiable by detecting overall 
increases in infection rates on given hospital units. Clonal outbreaks, however, may 
remain unnoticed since the increase in infections by a single rarer species may not 
significantly affect the overall infection rate. Molecular fingerprinting techniques that 
allow the identification of an organism’s genetic lineage based on highly variable 
sections of the microbial genome remain the gold standard for determining the clonality 
of bacterial isolates from different patients’ cultures of the same species.6 Nevertheless, it 
is both more efficient and more cost effective to first screen for potential clonal outbreaks 
by comparing antibiotic sensitivity patterns for each bacterial species identified by 
cultures, since antibiotic sensitivities are routinely ordered for therapeutic guidance. 
When sensitivity patterns suggest that infected patients share a common pathogen, 
hospitals then may do more expensive genetic tests to determine clonality.7 
To investigate and control potential outbreaks, hospital infection control staff 
confirm existing cases of disease, locate additional previously missed cases, and 
implement preventive measures to avoid further spread.8 Outbreak investigation 
combines the need to establish clonality of an infecting agent with the need to discern 
pseudoinfections and pseudooutbreaks from “true” outbreaks. Pseudoinfections are when 
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microorganisms (such as common skin contaminants) present in a stain or culture do not 
correspond to a clinical infection. Pseudo-outbreaks comprise a cluster of such 
pseudoinfections.4 Though pseudo-outbreaks are typically not important to investigate 
from a clinical perspective, they may be indicative of poor sample collection techniques. 
Thus, they are still important to detect and address. 
Computer-assisted healthcare-associated infection monitoring 
In the mid 1980’s, Evans and colleagues at LDS Hospital in Salt Lake City 
developed one of the earliest published systems for automated detection of healthcare-
associated infections, which also monitored antibiotic resistance patterns – the 
Computerized Infectious Disease Monitor, CIDM.9 To integrate other clinical data with 
information from the microbiology laboratory system, the Utah developers incorporated 
CIDM into LDS Hospital’s HELP hospital information system. The CIDM ran daily and 
generated a variety of alerts for infection control personnel. Overall, the CIDM 
demonstrated the future potential of computer-supported outbreak surveillance: it 
detected infections as accurately as infection control professionals and made clinically 
useful antibiotic selection recommendations.10  
In the early 1990’s, at Barnes Hospital in St. Louis, Kahn et al. developed 
GERMWATCHER, a computerized expert system used to detect nosocomial infections.11 
The microbiology laboratory system at Barnes Hospital generated reports in a semi-
structured format, using constrained, seemingly “natural” language that was generated 
using a limited terms dictionary. By leveraging the underlying Barnes microbiology 
terms dictionary, the researchers could use simple pattern matching to extract the 
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structured, standard-format portions of the report necessary for tracking nosocomial 
infections.  
Following and building upon the work of such early pioneers, other investigators 
have developed and demonstrated the reliability of more complex systems for tracking 
healthcare-associated infections.12 Some systems focused on tracking specific organisms 
(e.g., MRSA13); others on specific infection types (e.g., bloodstream infections14); and 
others on more general coverage for nosocomial infections of all types.15,16  
Systems with more limited coverage areas for infectious disease surveillance 
(e.g., detection constrained to a single hospital), have greater ability to use clinical reports 
to facilitate outbreak detection. For large-region surveillance, e.g., cities or states, the 
time costs associated with collecting and aggregating reports is prohibitive. At the 
University of Maryland Medical Center, Wright et al. developed a rule-based system that 
utilized data from clinical reports to help hospital infection control staff to generate 
automated “control charts” consisting of a bacterial species, a location, and an optional 
antibiotic resistance pattern. The control chart alerts notified users when characteristic 
patterns for specific pathogens were detected (e.g., when specific rare or dangerous 
organisms were detected, when pathogens had certain patterns of antibiotic resistances, or 
when a targeted pathogen it was isolated on a certain hospital unit).17 After configuring 
the control charts and analyzing retrospective data, the program was able to detect a 
number of outbreaks that the hospital infection control team had previously missed.17 
Brossette et al. implemented a different outbreak detection approach, using data 
mining techniques to discover from past institutional culture results novel association 
rules for surveillance.18 Brossette’s method did not require “pre-existing” triggers that 
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manually designated what constituted a clinically important finding. When applying this 
method to one year of the local hospital’s Pseudomonas aeruginosa antibiotic sensitivity 
results, Brossette’s system found short-term and long-term shifts in resistance patterns.18  
The World Health Organization (WHO) created WHONET, an algorithmic set of 
tools to perform retrospective analyses and derive antibiotic susceptibility trends.19,20 
While the WHONET software package was designed primarily to aid in monitoring and 
managing antibiotic resistance in collaborative hospital networks, it could also be used 
within individual hospitals. However, the WHONET version available as of July 2011 
does not yet include automated surveillance tools. Previously, a study integrating the 
SaTScan cluster detection software with WHONET demonstrated that standard, manual 
outbreak detection techniques missed potential Shigella outbreaks that SaTScan’s 
automated techniques caught.21 More recently, a study used WHONET and SaTScan to 
attempt to locate outbreaks within hospitals.22 That study again found that 
WHONET/SaTScan detected a number of potential outbreaks that manual infection 
control methods failed to find, and that automated methods could potentially provide 
helpful guidance to hospital infection control staff. 
At Regenstrief Institute in Indianapolis, Kho et al. made use of a city-wide health 
information exchange network to facilitate sharing data on patients with known positive 
MRSA cultures.23 Each individual site maintained a registry of all MRSA-positive 
patients and shared the registry with the other three participating city hospitals through a 
standardized interface. After approximately one year, their registry-based system 
generated 2,698 admission alerts for patients with a known history of MRSA, with 19% 
of alerts arising from data shared by another institution.24 
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Some commercial products include infection control applications that can be used 
for hospital-wide microbiological surveillance. Unfortunately, the commercial nature of 
such proprietary systems often limits the amount of information that their developers 
reveal through peer-reviewed publications. For example, Dr. Stanley Pestotnik and 
colleagues developed the Theradoc Expert System Platform based on the previously 
noted pioneering infection control research at LDS Hospital.25
 
Yet technical details on 
Theradoc’s operational algorithms and formal evaluations of that system’s efficacy are 
not publically available. Similarly, technical information about the MedMined suite 
evolved from Dr. Stephen Brossette’s data mining studies is not publically accessible.26 
A 2010 study deployed and evaluated DiversiLab, a system designed to aid 
infection control personnel in determining whether a cluster of bacterial cultures 
represents an outbreak or not. The Diversilab could provide simple molecular typing data 
for a number of bacterial species, e.g., from samples taken from patients suspected as 
victims of an outbreak.27 DiversiLab readily aided in the identification of outbreaks of 
Acinetobacter, S. maltophilia, Enterobacter cloacae complex, Klebsiella, and E. coli, but 
was less useful for P. aeruginosa, E. faecium, and MRSA. DiversiLab thus provided a 
quick method for confirming some potential outbreaks found using epidemiologic data, 
allowing infection control staff to act more rapidly to stop further spread. 
Electronic Syndromic Surveillance Systems 
Following the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States28, fears of bioterrorism 
sparked interest in syndromic surveillance. Syndromic surveillance systems use a variety 
of algorithmic approaches to rapidly identify potential infectious disease outbreaks within 
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large geographic areas (e.g., cities, counties, or states). Such systems use pre-clinical data 
(e.g., sales records for health-related products purchased in pharmacies, or chief 
complaints of patients seen in Emergency Rooms) gathered from the relevant geographic 
region. A review of syndromic surveillance system evaluations29 found that most early 
developers used purely temporal detection methods30-33, though some later incorporated 
spatial components34-36. Algorithms used for detection range from statistical methods 
developed originally for manufacturing process surveillance to specialized algorithms 
devised specifically for syndromic surveillance.37 Systems such as Pittsburgh’s RODS 
system36 and Harvard’s AEGIS system38 have been implemented for statewide 
monitoring in Pennsylvania, Utah, and Massachusetts. The RODS system was used short-
term for monitoring during the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics. During that short 
time interval, it generated two alerts, though fortunately neither corresponded to a public 
health issue.39 The CDC’s BioSense system40 can monitor data on a national scale. It has 
been applied successfully for a variety of purposes, including influenza monitoring41 and 
the tracking of health effects of San Diego’s 2007 wildfires.42 
Most syndromic surveillance systems do not make use of detailed clinical reports, 
such as culture results, because those data are neither in standard formats nor available 
rapidly or widely available enough in electronic format to be able to detect the “leading 
edge” of outbreaks in a large area.43 For example, Eurosentinel, a large manual disease 
surveillance project conducted in Europe, was only able to make use of clinical reports 
after a weekly update from participating physicians.39,43 Furthermore, an analysis of the 
utility of syndromic surveillance found that the positive predictive value and specificity 
were too low when used with clinical data due to the lag time in procuring such data.40 
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Syndromic surveillance methods have been successfully applied to smaller geographical 
regions as well, with one study demonstrating the ability to detect lower respiratory 
infection clusters within an individual city while using national retrospective data.44 
With the maturation of the field of syndromic surveillance, investigators have 
recently turned to fine-tuning existing system models. More current studies have focused 
on reducing false alarms,45 optimizing the public health response to surveillance 
alerts,46,47 standardizing syndrome definitions,48 and determining optimal parameters for 
frequently used syndromic surveillance algorithms.49  
Work on specialized syndromic surveillance projects has also expanded. Several 
recent studies have tried to detect clusters of individual diseases and disease groups (e.g., 
influenza,50-56 tuberculosis,57 and sexually-transmitted illnesses58). Others have instead 
attempted to determine the environmental causes for certain increases in symptoms,59-63 
including high-profile events such as the May 2011 Icelandic volcanic ash cloud.64,65 
Since the mid-2000’s, syndromic surveillance algorithm development has focused 
primarily on building on Martin Kulldorff’s original space-time scan statistic (STSS) 
developed originally in 1997.66 Kulldorff and others have continued to improve the initial 
algorithm and make its spatial search capabilities more flexible.67,68 Others have simply 
drawn inspiration from its design and have designed competing algorithms.69,70 
Background for Current Study 
Past approaches to automated methods of hospital outbreak detection fall into two 
categories: active and passive surveillance. Active surveillance approaches use decision 
support algorithms to automatically inform infection control staff of suspicious infectious 
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disease patterns that require further attention. Passive surveillance approaches provide 
tools that simply aggregate or display relevant information in a more usable and 
manipulable electronic format for infection control staff to review upon their own 
initiative, allowing them to better detect interesting patterns “manually”. 
The current study used four algorithms previously applied to regional syndromic 
surveillance to serve as screening tools for actively detecting potential clonal hospital 
outbreaks – individually and in combination. Two of these aberrancy detection 
algorithms originated in manufacturing quality control: cumulative sums (CUSUM) and 
exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA). The other two came from syndromic 
surveillance research: space-time scan statistic (STSS) and What’s Strange About Recent 
Events (WSARE). 
Statistical Process Control Algorithms: CUSUM and EWMA 
Statistical process control originated in 1931, when Walter Shewhart of Bell 
Laboratories first described control chart methodologies to monitor manufacturing 
processes.71 Statistical process control algorithms use previous data to estimate future 
values, including the mean and reasonable upper and lower limits. If actual future 
measurements fall within the predicted limits, the process is “under control.” New 
measurements that fall outside the calculated control limits may indicate that a 
noteworthy change has occurred in the underlying process. The simplest statistical 
process control algorithms set upper and lower limits as a multiple of the previously 
measured standard deviation and plot each new measurement against these limits. While 
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this approach provides a method easy enough to plot manually on a graph, it does not 
effectively detect small shifts in the mean.72  
CUSUM, the first algorithm deployed in the current study, is calculated by taking 
the cumulative summation of the difference between each measured value  and the 
estimated in-control mean 72: 
 
 
 
In a process that is under control, each measured value  should be reasonably 
close to the mean (e.g., within 2-3 standard deviations). Thus, a plot of each calculated 
value of  should be centered at zero with small fluctuations up or down. When 
calculating upper and lower bounds for , methods that increase the bounds over time 
(“V-mask” methods) have historically provided greater sensitivity to small shifts in the 
mean and decreased impact from older measurements as compared to traditional control 
charts.73,74 
Another approach to improving Shewhart’s original control charts, the 
exponentially weighted moving average statistic (EWMA), directly incorporates 
exponentially decreasing weights applied successively to old values, thus providing a 
measurement less affected by random noise than CUSUM. EWMA is recursively defined 
as: 
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where EWMA0 is the historical mean, Yt is the measurement at time t, and λ is the decay 
rate of past measurements, with 0 < λ ≤ 1.72 At λ=1, the EWMA formula matches the 
Shewhart control chart formula. Optimal λ values vary depending on the problem 
domain, but empirically, values between 0.2 and 0.3 have provided good performance in 
manufacturing.72,75  
The typical upper and lower bounds for EWMA are similar to those used in 
Shewhart’s control charts, and are given by  with standard deviation 
sewma and factor k depending on the problem domain.75 The value of λ affects the 
variance of the EWMA statistic and thus the limits, as the estimated variance is given by: 
 
 
where s2 is the historical variance. Though more difficult to calculate, EWMA charts 
have the benefit of being more sensitive to small shifts in the mean than Shewhart’s 
control charts while still being easy to interpret graphically. 
Syndromic Surveillance Algorithms: Space-time scan statistic and WSARE 
 
Martin Kulldorff first introduced the space-time scan statistic in 1997, and later 
provided a reference implementation, via the SaTScan system.66 At that time, most 
syndromic surveillance researchers used purely temporal disease cluster detection 
methods, including the algorithms used in statistical process control.29,37 The STSS 
algorithm incorporates spatial information into its detection as well to attempt to improve 
detection over a large geographic area. It uses a two-stage process. First, STSS searches 
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the study area for the circular region most likely to comprise a disease cluster, assuming 
the spread of the disease follows either a Bernoulli model or a Poisson model. Second, it 
estimates the statistical significance of the cluster using Monte Carlo simulation. 
Complete details regarding the STSS algorithm appear in Kulldorff’s publications.34,66,79  
Many studies have employed STSS with success, including those observing 
commonly occurring infectious diseases,34 emerging infectious diseases,76 and cancer 
incidence.77,78 The STSS approach has played a central role in many regional studies 
using WHONET,21,80,81 and in a recent study, investigators found that SaTScan could 
successfully bolster standard infection control practices in a hospital setting as well.22 
As STSS addressed the growing need for incorporating spatial data, WSARE 
addressed the growing need for a cluster detection algorithm that could incorporate 
multidimensional data (e.g., gender, age, and location in addition to disease status).29,30,37 
The WSARE approach first constructs a Bayesian network model based on the problem 
domain’s historical data. It then uses the Bayesian network to find the single “best” 
clustering rule for the given day and estimates a p-value using Benjamini and Hochberg’s 
False Discovery Rate method82 to adjust for the multiple hypothesis tests.30 Because the 
underlying Bayesian model can include a node for each data element, WSARE easily 
incorporates multidimensional data. For example, if the data include gender, zip code, 
and influenza diagnoses, WSARE could in theory detect an increase in influenza across 
the study region, an increase in influenza in women region-wide, or an increase in 
influenza in one specific zip code. The primary use of WSARE has occurred in 
conjunction with the RODS public health surveillance system83 -- both for temporary 
short term monitoring of the 2002 Winter Olympics39 and for long-term public health 
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surveillance of the state of Pennsylvania.84 Complete details of the WSARE algorithm 
appear in Wong et al.30 
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND: THE MICROPARSE SYSTEM AND PROJECT 
Overview of MicroParse 
The MicroParse project had as its objectives: (1) to provide Vanderbilt University 
Hospital (VUH) with computerized tools for monitoring microbiological data; (2) to 
provide the VUH Infection Control Service with tools to help monitor and track 
infection-relevant patient-related data such as culture results, hospital location, current 
orders, and contact precautions status. Prior to the MicroParse study, VUH microbiology 
data were only available in plain text (i.e., not formally structured) format from the 
microbiology laboratory system as individual culture reports or as a single patient’s lab 
study results. Clinicians viewed microbiology study results for a particular patient 
through integration of the microbiology-result-containing laboratory system with VUH’s 
electronic health record system (“StarPanel”). Access was limited to viewing the text of 
one microbiology test report at a time.  
Introduction: Development and Validation of MicroParse 
Providing VUH with automated tools for monitoring microbiological data first 
required an accurate source of microbiological data. As of 2005, VUH used a proprietary 
microbiology lab system (Triple G®) that did not allow access to its underlying database, 
thus making direct access to the microbiology data impossible. The plain text reports 
supplied by the microbiology lab system to physicians provided the only easily accessible 
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method of output. For computerized tools to make use of the plain text reports, however, 
another tool had to first parse the reports into a coded format. The MicroParse project 
aimed to provide the parsing functionality that created structured data outputs. 
Methods: Development and Validation of MicroParse 
Clinical Setting and Microbiology Data Source 
Vanderbilt University Hospital at the time of MicroParse development in 2005 
was a 650-bed academic medical facility located in Nashville, TN. Its microbiology lab 
system processed nearly 20,000 unique microbiology culture and test reports per month. 
The proprietary software underlying Triple G® generated microbiology reports only in a 
human-readable format with variable structure. That made report parsing (by computer 
algorithms) to identify pathogen names and other characteristics less than 
straightforward.  
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Figure 2: Sample plain text microbiology report 
Description of MicroParse 
The project created a parsing program, MicroParse, to process the microbiology 
text reports into usable microorganism-related data. To the present time, for purposes of 
security, confidentiality, and convenience of data access, MicroParse runs on the 
protected set of machines within the cluster of servers dedicated to StarPanel, VUH’s 
electronic health record system. The StarPanel team configured their system to feed the 
plain text microbiology reports to MicroParse every 10 minutes. Then, Microparse 
processed each new report, and in turn passed structured data back to StarPanel for 
storage.  
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MicroParse first decomposes each plain text report into 4 sections: preamble, 
Gram stain, culture, and susceptibilities (Figure 2). The preamble contains information 
about the culture result, including the culture category (e.g., blood, CSF, urine), the report 
time and date, the report status (i.e., preliminary or final), and the site from which the 
specimen was taken (e.g., arm wound, bone marrow). Because the preamble tends to 
follow a fairly specific order with common terms, this information is easily recognized 
using Perl-compatible regular expressions.85 For example, to extract the report’s status, 
MicroParse uses:  
/Report status:([a-zA-Z ]+)/ 
 
The Gram stain and culture sections were more difficult to parse since they more 
closely approximated natural language. However, text from these sections comes 
primarily from the dictionary of microbiology terms defined within Triple G (“VUH 
Microbiology Thesaurus”) stored within the microbiology lab system. To generate 
reports, lab technicians select finding codes based on the results of the test or culture; the 
lab system then enters a standardized phrase into the report. However, technicians may 
also include free text in the reports, and some of the phrases share words in common, 
making recognition of the original coded terms difficult. Fortunately, unlike most other 
data within the microbiology lab system, the microbiology terms dictionary is externally 
accessible. This allowed MicroParse to use an externalized copy of the VUH 
Microbiology Thesaurus as an aid to parsing reports.  
The susceptibilities section of the textual VUH Microbiology reports contains a 
table that, in its top row, indicates an abbreviation for each isolated bacterium, and on 
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subsequent rows, indicated only by column position, the results of testing each 
organism’s growth in the presence of various antibiotics. The antibiotics for which 
susceptibilities were tested are named in the first (leftmost) column of the table rows 
(except the first row). The table columns are generally fixed-width fields, though 
complications can arise. For example, the abbreviated names often run together in the 
first row and the abbreviations are occasionally inconsistent (e.g., nonspecific coagulase-
negative staphylococcus can appear with any of 6 different column headings). Without 
consistency in the column names, demarcating the column breaks can be difficult. Also, 
when the microbiology laboratory provides minimum inhibitory concentrations for a 
given isolated bacterium, unpredictable changes occur in the column alignments. When 
multiple bacteria grow from a single culture and their sensitivities are presented as side-
by-side columns in a report, it is often the case that not all organisms were tested against 
all antibiotics, so the absence of testing is indicated by blank fields (extra spaces) within 
the table columns – further complicating the parsing task. 
After processing a given culture report, MicroParse stored the information in a 
MySQL database, also located within the StarPanel machine cluster. Figure 3 shows an 
example of the parsed fields for one of the lines in the report shown in Figure 2. In this 
case, MicroParse stored the codes IITO (“isolated in thio only”) and STRALP 
(“streptococcus alpha”), and labeled their identification status as “final.” The database 
then interfaced with StarPanel to provide information about organisms identified in the 
report to other programs within VUMC. 
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Parsing the Gram Stain and Culture Sections 
Much of the text found in both the culture and Gram stain sections was drawn 
directly from the VUH Microbiology Thesaurus. For example, to identify an isolated 
bacterium in the culture section, it was common to see a term from the categories QUANT 
(quantity) and FIDORG (final identified organism) (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3: Breaking culture/gram stain sections into component terms 
The Thesaurus allowed MicroParse to process the Gram stain and culture results. 
The Gram stain segment of the report tends to be straightforward, as nearly all lines 
consist of a STAINQTY term followed a STAINDESC term, making the parsing process 
simple. The culture section often contains more complex information, however. 
To parse the culture section, MicroParse first processes the VUH Microbiology 
Thesaurus into a word trie.86 MicroParse first breaks each phrase in the terms dictionary 
into its constituent words. Starting with the first word in the phrase, MicroParse then 
builds the trie from these words, storing the valid partial phrases along with an indication 
of where completed phrases end (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Creating the MicroParse word trie 
Once MicroParse has created the trie as a reference source, it is ready to process 
the text in the culture section. The culture section is split into paragraphs based on line 
breaks, and for each paragraph, MicroParse searches the trie for all possible matching 
phrases. It then chooses as an encoding the combination of phrases that maximizes the 
number of parsed words while minimizing the number of phrases used (see Figure 5). A 
placeholder entry in the trie, UNPARSED, captures all phrases MicroParse encounters that 
do not have any valid matches in the dictionary.  
 
Figure 5: Matching text to coded phrases.  
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MicroParse finds all possible matches to encoded phrases within the block of text 
and selects the combination of codes that leaves the fewest possible words unparsed and 
uses the least number of phrases. In this example, MicroParse matches all words using 
two codes, BOTHGS and GPCCLR. 
Validation of MicroParse Data Capture Techniques 
To confirm that MicroParse properly parsed reports and retrieved the clinically 
relevant information from them, the MicroParse project underwent a validation study. 
MicroParse retrieved all parsed VUH culture reports from 3 days for analysis: Saturday, 
January 6, 2007, Monday, January 15, 2007, and Friday, January 19, 2007. Project 
members also acquired a complete data dump of all microbiology reports issued on those 
three days directly from the microbiology laboratory system to confirm that MicroParse 
did not incorrectly alter the text of reports or miss any reports. 
Taking this information, a computer script matched the reports to records in the 
MicroParse database. Dr. Thomas Talbot, an Infectious Disease expert, reviewed all of 
the matched records from the above-mentioned sample to confirm that the information 
stored in the MicroParse database accurately reflected all relevant content found in the 
original microbiology lab report.  
Extending the MicroParse Database: Non-narrative Results 
As MicroParse gradually garnered increasing use within VUH’s clinical practice, 
feedback from infection control staff indicated that including all available 
microbiological lab data in the MicroParse database would provide a more complete 
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picture of hospital infections than just the narrative reports. Clinical project members 
reviewed a complete list of all test types that the VUH lab system processed and 
determined which could be relevant for determining patients with bacterial, viral, or 
fungal infections. These non-narrative results consisted of an HL7 message giving the 
test name (e.g., a PCR or DFA test result for a specific pathogen), internal test ID code, 
and a test result. Project members reviewed past results for each of the test types to 
determine how to identify a positive or negative result for each individual test and 
constructed Perl-compatible regular expressions85 to identify them. Project members then 
updated the VUH Microbiology Thesaurus to include additional non-“official” codes for 
positive and negative non-narrative results, allowing users of the MicroParse database to 
retrieve parsed results from non-narrative reports in the same format as the narrative 
reports. 
Results: Development and Validation of MicroParse 
As of July 2011, MicroParse handled approximately 1,050 VUH microbiology 
reports per day. It is able to process and store reports at a peak rate of approximately 150 
reports per second, yielding a theoretical limit of over 10,000,000 reports per day. As of 
July 18, 2011, the MicroParse database contained 2.6 million reports, using 2.4GB of 
disk space. During the validation study of MicroParse, the expert reviewer, Dr. Talbot, 
found parsing errors with 17 reports out of 1,895 reviewed reports (0.9%), with 11 errors 
being immediately fixable and promptly corrected generically.  
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Discussion: Development and Validation of MicroParse 
Principal Findings of the MicroParse Validation Study 
During its validation study, MicroParse performed well. MicroParse processed 
and stored reports very quickly and scales well even if the number of reports processed 
by VUH increases significantly. Most of the issues encountered by the expert reviewer 
took little effort to fix. The problem with linking reports based on free text references 
within one of the reports presented a more difficult obstacle. It would require more 
sophisticated parsing techniques to potentially extract the information contained in the 
references (e.g., “E coli – sensitivities same as most recent previous culture”). 
Institutional Use of MicroParse 
MicroParse has provided VUH clinicians and informaticians with new 
opportunities. Early pilot MicroParse application projects included an MRSA/VRE 
tracking dashboard and automated antibiogram generation capabilities. MicroParse has 
also provided a number of investigational studies and real-time monitoring systems with 
microbiology result data that would have previously required manual electronic chart 
reviews, enabling previously costly and time-consuming activities to be automated. 
The VUH Enterprise Data Warehouse also has received data in near real-time 
from MicroParse. This has further allowed other institutional projects to take advantage 
of the MicroParse dataset. The largest such project, named VIPER, provides VUH 
infection preventionists with a summary of all microbiological findings in the hospital 
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with the option to review more thoroughly data on relevant on individual organisms or 
patients. 
MicroParse Post-validation Problems 
Though the initial validation study found few problems with MicroParse’s parsing 
techniques, over time, other issues became apparent. The new issues largely arose from 
the lab system’s dynamic nature. Since the validation study in 2007, the lab system has 
seen many changes, including a large update from the system’s vendor, which required 
some changes to the parsing process. In addition, VUH lab technicians sporadically add 
new entries to the VUH Microbiology Thesaurus, modify the names of antibiotics within 
the system, or modify the organism “short names” used in the Susceptibilities section of 
the narrative reports. Such changes lead to incorrect parses or incorrect linkages by 
MicroParse across reports on organism names or antibiotics if MicroParse is not kept up 
to date. 
Furthermore, project members added an organism tagging table to the MicroParse 
database mapping VUH Microbiology Thesaurus terms to bacterial, viral, and fungal 
species. This table allowed users to search for positive or negative reports for specific 
organisms. However, occasional free text reports or reports from external labs imported 
into the VUH lab system can cause MicroParse to wrongly declare a positive finding 
when there is none. For example, without adding additional entries to the Microbiology 
Thesaurus, MicroParse would process the phrase “negative for Bordetella pertussis” as 
the codes NEGATIVE, UNPARSED, (for) and BORDPE (Bordetella pertussis) and a later 
search for positive reports for B. pertussis would incorrectly retrieve this report. This 
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problem could be addressed with more sophisticated natural language processing (NLP) 
techniques. However, as it is a relatively rare issue, adding NLP could potentially cause 
new unforeseen problems. 
Lastly, though adding the previously mentioned non-narrative tests has benefited 
MicroParse’s users, the list of tests, the associated positive/negative regular expressions, 
and the dummy Thesaurus entries all require updating over time as new tests become 
available to clinicians to keep MicroParse from missing relevant organism data. This 
creates a minor technical issue since a clinical user set to update the table would struggle 
with constructing the regular expressions and a technical user would struggle with 
identifying the new tests that require inclusion. It also creates an organizational issue in 
maintaining the linkage to the StarPanel servers to ensure that the correct tests are 
reaching MicroParse. Because of the mechanism used to send reports from StarPanel to 
MicroParse, updating the list of tests currently requires a change to a core StarPanel Perl 
module, necessitating coordination with the StarPanel team. 
Despite these issues, however, MicroParse provides a valuable data resource to 
VUH. Maintenance and operation of MicroParse involves low personnel and computing 
resource requirements. Eventually, VUH plans to adopt a new lab management system 
that allows encoded export of results, thus potentially making MicroParse obsolete. 
Nevertheless, given the cost and labor requirements necessary to make such an upgrade, 
and the likelihood that at least some (e.g., outside laboratory) reports will be unstructured 
as free text entered by a laboratory technician, MicroParse will continue to have utility 
for the foreseeable future. 
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Summary of MicroParse Project 
The MicroParse project provided VUH clinicians and staff with new access to 
microbiological data that has been since used to improve patient care. The MicroParse 
tool allows its users to search the microbiology results database flexibly, facilitating a 
number of approaches to monitoring microbiological data.  
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CHAPTER III 
BACKGROUND: ALGORITHM SELECTION – MIASMA DEVELOPMENTAL 
STUDY 
The MIASMA developmental study evaluated the ability of four aberrancy 
detection algorithms to function as a screening tool for recognizing potentially clonal 
microbiological outbreaks including identification by non-culture results. The goals were 
to do so earlier and more effectively than previous manual methods. Successful 
MIASMA automated alerting might allow infection control staff to intervene sooner, 
control outbreaks earlier, and potentially prevent further transmission. This 
developmental study also determined if the targeted automated surveillance methods 
could achieve better performance than manual surveillance methods on specific, narrow, 
objective measures, recognizing that in other situations, manual methods might be more 
effective. By determining which outbreak characteristics each automated method most 
easily and accurately detected, the study provided insight into how to apply future 
automated systems in actual practice settings. 
Portions of the following text sections have been adapted from “Evaluating the 
utility of syndromic surveillance algorithms for screening to detect potentially clonal 
hospital infection outbreaks” by Carnevale, Talbot, Schaffner, Bloch, Daniels, and Miller, 
JAMIA 18(4), July 2011.87 
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Algorithm Analysis: Methods 
MIASMA Developmental Algorithm Analysis: Setting 
 
The developmental study was conducted at Vanderbilt University using data from 
the Vanderbilt University Hospital (VUH), The Vanderbilt Clinic, and the Monroe Carell 
Jr. Children’s Hospital at Vanderbilt. The Vanderbilt Institutional Review Board 
approved the study design prior to conducting the study.  
Data for this study was obtained using MicroParse, a computer program 
previously described in Chapter II that receives all microbiology reports from the 
Vanderbilt Medical Center microbiology laboratory via the electronic medical record 
(EMR) system (see Chapter II). MicroParse analyzes and encodes the “free text” natural 
language culture result output from the microbiology reports and stores the coded results 
corresponding to organism results and antibiotic sensitivities in a database. The current 
study extracted “positive” microbiological cultures (preliminary, final, and final with 
antibiotic sensitivities) and related tests (e.g., PCR and DFA tests) from MicroParse. 
“Positive” tests that indicated the presence of a potential pathogen were then forwarded 
for analysis in the current project using the cluster detection algorithms. Similar 
MicroParse output data were available to VUH Infection Control personnel during their 
real-time outbreak detection efforts.  
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Algorithm Analysis: Goals of Developmental Study 
The MIASMA developmental study measured the performance characteristics of 
four existing aberrancy detection algorithms using individual “positive” microbial 
identification instances at VUH. A secondary goal was to determine how one might later 
combine the algorithms into a single, optimal, future detection system. Thus, the 
developmental study required accurate measurement of each algorithm’s performance 
metrics individually and in various combinations.  
Algorithm Analysis: Developmental Study Overview 
The developmental study evaluated four algorithms, including two custom 
implementations (CUSUM72 and EWMA72) and two reference implementations 
(WSARE30 and Kulldorff’s space-time scan statistic66; SaTScan). The de-identified 
dataset included daily case counts for each organism taken from all microbiologic culture 
data collected from 2001 through 2006 from inpatient units, outpatient clinics, and 
emergency rooms. It included only the first result of a given culture type (i.e., organism 
and sensitivity pattern) for each patient on each unit to avoid giving extra weight to 
multiple serial cultures of the same organism from the same patient.  
The developmental study comprised three phases. Phase 1 implemented the four 
aberrancy detection algorithms using the hospital-derived retrospective microbiologic 
culture data, producing a list of potential past outbreak clusters. For review purposes, the 
PI also developed a web-based tool for displaying the relevant microbiological data for 
each cluster for Infection Control experts’ review.  
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In developmental study Phase 2, four Vanderbilt University School of Medicine 
Infectious Diseases faculty members, who were blinded to algorithm source, reviewed 
the algorithm-generated suspected clusters and categorized them as probable, possible, or 
non-outbreaks. This was accomplished using the web-based tool, and with it, experts also 
assessed whether or not the cluster would have merited investigation had they been aware 
of the cluster at the time. The developmental study labeled expert-reviewed clusters 
deemed to be probable outbreaks or possible outbreaks that merited further investigation 
as “candidate outbreaks.” Conversely, possible outbreaks or non-outbreaks not meriting 
investigation were called false positives. The study excluded clusters that experts labeled 
non-outbreaks that merited investigation (e.g., a cluster suggesting poor sample collection 
techniques) from analysis to avoid unfairly penalizing or rewarding individual 
algorithms. Table 1 summarizes the cluster classification process. The list of reviewed 
clusters also included three confirmed outbreaks that had been independently identified 
previously by the hospital’s infection control staff. Figure 6 summarizes the process 
followed for this phase.  
 
In developmental study Phase 3, project members empirically used the Phase 2 
results as feedback to adjust configuration parameters associated with each algorithm and 
investigated additional methods for combining the algorithms’ output into a single 
Table 1: Clusters considered as candidate outbreaks based on expert review 
 Probable 
outbreak 
Possible 
outbreak 
Non-outbreak 
Would investigate Candidate Candidate Exclude 
No investigation 
necessary 
Candidate False 
positive 
False positive 
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outbreak detection screening tool. The investigators then carried out a 6-month 
retrospective evaluation of the new system. 
 
Figure 6: Summary of methods used in Study Phase 2 
Algorithm Analysis Phase 1: Algorithm Implementation and Execution 
The developmental study configured each algorithm to identify clusters of 
positive cultures from daily case-culture counts for each organism – both for individual 
hospital units and across the entire institution. The study divided the culture dataset into 
three parts. The first set (1 year; 1/1/2001-12/31/2001) provided historical “seed” data for 
each algorithm. The second set (3 years; 1/1/2002-12/31/2004) served as a testing set for 
tuning the parameters of each algorithm and designing the review module before study 
initiation. This second set also provided additional historical baseline data for the final 
review. The third set (2 years; 1/1/2005-12/31/2006) provided the testing data for the 
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study Phase 2 expert review. The study converted output from each of the four study 
algorithms into a common format to prevent the reviewers from identifying which 
algorithm had generated a given cluster.  
Algorithm Analysis Phase 2: Expert Review Process 
The developmental study assigned two of the four expert reviewers to examine 
each algorithm-identified potential cluster independently. Discordant assessments were 
resolved by submitting each to a “tiebreaker” reviewer randomly selected from the two 
reviewers who had not previously evaluated the cluster. To calibrate the reliability of the 
tiebreaking opinions, the study also presented the tiebreak reviewers with several 
randomly chosen clusters on which the first two reviewers’ determinations agreed (either 
as “candidates” or not).  
The developmental study supplemented the list of candidate outbreaks identified 
by the review process (as defined above) with three infection control-investigated clusters 
(IC clusters) that had been independently characterized previously by the hospital’s 
infection control staff. These three consisted of disease clusters subjected to genetic or 
serologic testing during the study time period. 
Following the clinicians’ reviews, the study calculated the sensitivity and positive 
predictive value (recall and precision) for each cluster identification algorithm based on 
the “consensus” classifications (by two or three reviewers, per protocol) of suspected 
outbreaks and IC clusters. The study compared the individual algorithms’ performance 
statistics pairwise using McNemar’s test. 
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Algorithm Analysis Phase 3: Parameter Tuning, Precision-Recall Analysis, Combined 
Tool Development, and Retrospective Evaluation 
In developmental study Phase 3, the project empirically analyzed the effects of 
varying algorithm parameters on each algorithm’s ability to identify Phase 2 expert-
labeled candidate outbreaks. The study also explored potential methods of combining the 
individual algorithms with additional heuristic data to produce better candidate outbreak 
identification than obtained by the individual algorithms per se.  
A first approach was to adjust parameters for whichever customizable algorithm 
that demonstrated better performance in Phase 2 (CUSUM or EWMA) to detect as many 
of the candidate outbreaks as possible. For each of the expert-identified candidate 
outbreak clusters, the study calculated k, the minimum threshold at which the chosen 
algorithm would generate an alert for the outbreak, using varying decay rates λ (0.05, 
0.07, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, and 0.3). Project members recorded the number of additional 
alerts that would also have triggered at the given value of k. Based on these 
measurements, the study determined the optimal value of λ and generated precision-recall 
curves for varying values of k when using the optimized algorithm. 
The developmental study also explored methods of combining the output from the 
four original algorithms using various scoring metrics by which the resulting clusters 
could be ranked. A first step attempted to order the clusters by their previously measured 
value of k. Project members then made additional adjustments to the rank weights 
regarding several features identified as potentially important by the expert Infectious 
Disease faculty reviewers during the Phase 2 review, including hospital location type 
(inpatient vs. outpatient) and primary culture source type (urine, blood, wound, etc.).  
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The developmental study also examined the potential for not “alerting” for 
clusters comprised of organisms with substantially different antibiotic susceptibilities. 
This approach had the potential to eliminate noise due to clusters comprised of different 
clones from the same bacterial species. This analysis focused on clusters for which 
sensitivity results were available for at least 50% of their component cultures. Project 
members developed an algorithm that calculated for each cluster an antibiotic 
susceptibility variability score by summing the number of individual antibiotic sensitivity 
result pairwise differences within the cluster and weighting the overall result by the 
number of cultures within the cluster having each of the compared patterns. The resulting 
score thus represented the average number of differing antibiotic sensitivities between 
each pair of bacterial isolates. This filtering method, applied to the output of the 
individual screening algorithms, allowed the analysis to exclude clusters not meeting 
empirically derived uniformity limits (i.e., those that appeared to be non-clonal based on 
sufficiently varied culture sensitivities) while still allowing the system to detect 
potentially clonal clusters that had mutated only slightly in their antibiotic resistance over 
the course of the outbreak. A final best-case heuristic combination of all of these new 
methods comprised the Phase 3 combined detection system.  
With the above-described adjustments in place, Phase 3 of the developmental 
study concluded by conducting a brief retrospective validation of the combined outbreak 
detection system’s recall. The system was run using new data from 1/1/2010-6/30/2010 
and the resulting clusters were compared to the list of confirmed outbreaks that had been 
previously discovered by hospital infection control staff using manual methods for that 
time period. 
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Algorithm Analysis: Results 
Algorithm Analysis Phase 1: Algorithm Parameters in Developmental Study 
Using the first and second datasets, the MIASMA developmental study 
empirically adjusted the parameters for each algorithm. For EWMA, the project team set 
a decay rate λ = 0.3 and an alerting threshold k =5. For CUSUM, the project team used a 
V-mask for determining the alerting threshold with a daily rise of 3 times the standard 
deviation of the CUSUM statistic for each particular organism. SaTScan was executed 
using its purely temporal Poisson model, and WSARE was executed using Fisher’s exact 
scoring metric with 100 randomizations for each day. 
Algorithm Analysis Phase 2.1: Expert Review Results in Developmental Study 
For institution-wide microbial data covering the two-year developmental study 
period, the four outbreak detection algorithms collectively generated a total of 257 alerts 
(CUSUM: 114, EWMA: 66, SaTScan: 21, WSARE: 56). To present alerts more 
efficiently to clinical expert reviewers, the study combined any computer-generated alerts 
with start and stop dates differing by fewer than two days into one single alert. As a 
result, six alerts detected by two algorithms and one alert detected by three algorithms 
were combined to form the final review list of 249 cluster alerts.  
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Pairwise percent agreement on the expert-reviewed clusters ranged from 79% to 
88% with Cohen’s kappa ranging from 0.11 to 0.49 (Table 2). Overall, reviewers agreed 
on their determinations for 210 of the 249 alerts, with 17 (8.1%) deemed candidate 
outbreaks. 
For the 39 clusters on which the pair of initial reviewer assessments disagreed, the 
study assigned a randomly selected third reviewer. Of the 39, the third reviewer deemed 
nine (23%) to be candidate outbreaks. In addition, for calibration determination, the third 
reviewer also rated six randomly selected candidate outbreaks (where the two initial 
reviewers agreed the cluster was a potential outbreak) and six randomly selected false 
alarms (where the reviewers had agreed the cluster was not an outbreak). The third 
reviewer agreed with the first two reviewers on all six of the false alarms. However, for 
the six pairwise-agreed-upon candidate outbreaks, the third expert reviewer only agreed 
with the initial experts’ judgment once (17%).  
Table 2: Percent agreement between reviewers 
(Cohen's kappa in parentheses) 
Reviewer A Reviewer B % Agreement 
1 2 86% (0.22) 
1 3 81% (0.47) 
1 4 88% (0.48) 
2 3 85% (0.49) 
2 4 88% (0.38) 
3 4 79% (0.11) 
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The hospital infection control service had previously identified five suspected 
outbreak clusters during the developmental study period. Those clusters were not 
detected by any of the algorithms as originally configured for the Phase 1 study. Of the 
five, 2 have been excluded methodologically from consideration by the study analysis. In 
one, the lab assay for the involved organism, C. difficile, was not included in the study 
data input since the dataset only included organisms identified by microbiological 
culturing and thus C. difficile antigen test results could not be processed by the detection 
Table 3: Algorithm-detected candidate outbreaks by organism, cluster length in days, and 
location type 
Organism Days Location 
Acinetobacter baumannii 1  inpatient 
Shigella sonnei 1  outpatient 
Enterobacter sakazakii 1  housewide 
Acinetobacter species 1  inpatient 
Acinetobacter species 1  outpatient 
Acinetobacter baumannii 1  inpatient 
Enterovirus 3  housewide 
Staphylococcus aureus 3  outpatient 
Enterovirus 4  housewide 
Moraxella catarrhalis 5  inpatient 
Clostridium perfringens 6  housewide 
Mycobacterium avium complex 6  housewide 
Acinetobacter baumannii 7  inpatient 
Shigella sonnei 9  outpatient 
Salmonella serotype mbandaka 13  housewide 
Proteus mirabilis 17  outpatient 
Plesiomonas shigelloides 18  housewide 
RSV 25  housewide 
Shigella sonnei 30  housewide 
Mycobacterium avium complex 61  housewide 
Diphtheroids species 63  housewide 
Enterovirus 64  housewide 
Candida albicans 67  inpatient 
Shigella sonnei 88  housewide 
Diphtheroids species 89  housewide 
RSV 140  housewide 
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algorithms. In the other, the outbreak spanned several months and began prior to the 
beginning of the study period. The developmental study “gold standard” outbreak dataset 
therefore contained 29 candidate outbreaks: 17 from the initial expert consensus review, 
9 from the second expert conflict-resolving review, and 3 from the infection control 
archival data. Table 3 shows the 26 candidate outbreaks detected by the algorithms. 
Algorithm Analysis Phase 2.2: Algorithm Performance during Developmental Study 
For the four evaluated algorithms, positive predictive value relative to the expert-
determined gold standard ranged from 5.3% to 29%, with sensitivities ranging from 0.21 
to 0.31. Table 4 shows individual results for each algorithm. The PI performed pairwise 
comparisons of each algorithm’s performance using McNemar’s exact test. The 
differences in sensitivity were not sufficient to reject the null hypothesis that the 
algorithms had identical performance. For positive predictive value, CUSUM was 
significantly lower than all other algorithms (p<0.001 in all comparisons), and EWMA 
and WSARE were significantly lower than SaTScan (p<0.001 for each).  
 
 
 
Stratifying the analysis by location type (hospital-wide clusters and inpatient units 
as inpatient; clinics and emergency rooms as outpatient) demonstrated that clusters from 
Table 4: Cluster determination by algorithm 
 Candidate Non-candidate PPV Sensitivity 
CUSUM 6 108 5.3% 0.21 
EWMA 9 57 14% 0.31 
SaTScan 6 15 29% 0.21 
WSARE 7 49 13% 0.24 
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inpatient locations were much more likely to be considered candidate outbreaks than 
clusters from outpatient locations (inpatient: 21/120 clusters vs. outpatient: 5/129 
clusters; chi-square p=0.002). Table 5 shows results and positive predictive values for 
each algorithm stratified by inpatient/outpatient location.  
 
 
Algorithm Analysis Phase 3.1: Parameter Adjustment Resulting from Developmental 
Study  
As EWMA yielded both better PPV and sensitivity than CUSUM, the 
developmental study team adjusted EWMA’s parameters in Phase 3. Testing various 
possible decay rates for EWMA parameters indicated that higher decay rates tended to 
decrease false positive rates as shown in Table 6, as was suggested by past research in the 
domain.49 For the organism/unit combinations given in the 29 system-detectable 
candidate outbreaks, EWMA’s λ parameter set to 0.05 yielded 32 potential false alarms 
vs. 8 false alarms at λ = 0.3. Using λ = 0.3 and k=5, EWMA detected 24 of the 29 
candidate outbreaks including the 3 infection-control-confirmed outbreaks, but with 629 
false positive alerts. Upon increasing the EWMA k value to 6, the system detected 23 of 
29 gold standard candidate outbreaks, with 467 false alarms, but excluded one of the 
Table 5: Algorithm performance stratified by 
cluster location (PPV in parentheses) 
  Outpatient Inpatient 
CUSUM 0/55 (0%) 6/59 (10.2%) 
EWMA 3/30 (10%) 6/36 (16.7%) 
SaTScan 0/0 6/21 (28.6%) 
WSARE 2/46 (4.3%) 5/10 (50%) 
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confirmed outbreaks. Recall-precision analysis yielded an area under the curve (AUC) of 
0.127. Figure 7 shows the recall-precision curve for the adjusted EWMA algorithm along 
with the initial performance of the four unadjusted algorithms. 
 
 
Table 6: EWMA false alarms 
generated in 29 organism/unit 
combinations 
λ 
False positive 
alerts 
0.05 32 
0.07 24 
0.1 21 
0.15 13 
0.2 9 
0.25 9 
0.3 8 
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Algorithm Analysis Phase 3.2: Scoring Metrics in Developmental Study 
Using the minimum alerting threshold k as the initial ranking metric to sort the 
original list of 249 clusters generated by the four algorithms yielded an AUC of 0.28. 
Figure 7 shows the recall-precision curve for this initial metric, with the curve for the 
adjusted EWMA and points for each of the individual algorithms. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 7: Precision-recall measurements for individual algorithms; precision-recall curves for EWMA 
adjustments and initial scoring metric 
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To investigate whether primary culture specimen type (e.g., blood, urine, wound, 
etc.) could help to separate clinically significant clusters from less important ones, project 
members developed an algorithm that labeled each cluster by specimen type if more than 
50% of the cultures in a given cluster shared a common source. A chi-square test 
compared that specimen type to all other cultures independent of source type. The only 
statistically significant relationship this analysis identified was that urine cultures were 
less reliable indicators of clusters than other culture sites (2.0% of urine vs. 13% non-
urine; p=0.03). After adjusting the ranking metric downward for clusters of urine 
cultures, the k-sorted precision-recall AUC improved from 0.28 to 0.36. As observed in 
Phase 2, clusters in inpatient locations were more likely to produce candidate outbreaks 
than clusters in outpatient units. After increasing the ranking metric for inpatient clusters, 
the AUC rose from 0.36 to 0.49. 
Project members calculated antibiotic susceptibility difference scores for the 165 
clusters that met the 50% criterion, including 6 of the 19 candidate outbreaks. Antibiotic 
susceptibility difference scores ranged from 0 to 138 in the false alarm clusters and from 
0 to 2.7 in the candidate outbreaks. Based on these results, project members generated 
new precision-recall curves after eliminating all clusters with similarity scores greater 
than a conservative threshold of 5 and an aggressive threshold of 3. These adjustments 
increased the precision-recall AUC from 0.49 to 0.53 for the conservative threshold and 
to 0.55 for the aggressive threshold. Precision-recall curves for each of these adjustments 
are shown in Figure 8. 
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Algorithm Analysis Phase 3.3: Retrospective Evaluation of Combined Algorithms 
During the 6 month retrospective evaluation period, infection control staff 
identified and confirmed two single-unit outbreaks: an outbreak of vancomycin-resistant 
Enterococcus, and an outbreak of C. difficile. Unlike the Phase 2 dataset, in Phase 3, non-
culture assays were added, allowing the system to detect the C. difficile outbreak. The 
system detected a total of 41 clusters during that time period, including both of the 
confirmed outbreak clusters. No Phase 2-type expert analyses of the other 39 clusters 
were conducted. 
 
 
 
Algorithm Analysis: Discussion 
The exploratory MIASMA developmental study attempted to determine whether 
one or more aberrancy detection algorithms might be adapted to screening for potentially 
clonal hospital outbreak detection. Because each algorithm produced a list of 
“interesting” suspect clusters substantially different from the others, an ideal system in 
this setting would consist of multiple algorithms working together. 
Algorithm Analysis: Cluster Review for Developmental Study 
Few candidate outbreaks were detected by more than one algorithm. In addition, 
each candidate algorithm varied greatly in the nature of the detected clusters. To some 
 
Figure 8: Precision-recall curves for adjusted scoring metrics 
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extent, the initial algorithm tuning parameters that were used in the developmental study 
may have pre-determined these results. Since the design of each algorithm focused on 
more immediate detection of outbreaks for syndromic surveillance, WSARE and 
SaTScan favored very short-term clusters – most candidate outbreaks for which they 
generated alerts lasted 1-3 days. By contrast, EWMA included some short-term clusters, 
but alerted on many more clusters with durations in the 1-2 week range. Finally, CUSUM 
showed the greatest variation, detecting a few short-duration clusters, but also some quite 
long ones that spanned multiple months. These lengthy “clusters” tended to be 
uninteresting to the reviewers, since they did not seem to represent an outbreak with a 
single source. 
Analysis of the expert review process demonstrated the degree of subjectivity in 
determining which clusters were potentially interesting. The first round of reviews only 
managed moderate levels of inter-rater agreement as shown in Table 2. Because the 
overall prevalence of true positive clusters was relatively low, measured values of 
Cohen’s kappa were low despite a high percentage of agreement between reviewers. The 
low kappa suggests that despite having similar training and using similar review criteria, 
the expert reviewers disagreed fairly often, and that constructing a true gold standard is 
not possible. In the second round “tiebreaker” reviews, the third reviewer only agreed 
with the initial reviews on 17% of the “seed” candidate outbreaks. By contrast, when the 
third reviewer examined clusters for which one of the two had designated it as a 
candidate cluster and the other original reviewer did not, the third reviewer designated the 
cluster as a candidate 23% of the time.  
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The low reviewer agreement suggests that an ideal hospital outbreak detection 
screening tool should favor sensitivity over positive predictive value since experts may 
disagree on which clusters merit further investigation. This strategy is further supported 
by standard infection control practice: in a prospective study, further investigation 
including molecular typing to confirm clonality would have followed for each of the 
potentially interesting clusters. Because such investigation will easily distinguish true 
positives from false positives, it is more important that the detection system acts as a 
“screening test” that does not produce many false negatives. 
After the developmental study review process, the infection control experts 
suggested a number of ways to improve potential MIASMA detection and determination 
processes. First, a few simple rules could significantly reduce the false positive rate. For 
example, certain culture types (e.g., urine), certain organisms (e.g., coagulase-negative 
Staphylococcus), and certain hospital units (e.g., emergency department) do not often 
correspond to outbreaks, and thus the system should require a higher outbreak alerting 
threshold in such situations. Alternatively, rare and dangerous organisms (e.g., Bacillus 
anthracis) should trigger an alert for a single case. More granular patient unit groupings 
would also be helpful. In some of the hospital-wide clusters, the reviewers suspected 
there could be something of interest occurring within a subset of the involved hospital 
units, such as two or three geographically adjacent units, or two units that frequently 
exchanged patients (e.g., the general surgery floor and the surgical ICU). Lastly, the 
reviewers noted that some of the identified clusters might productively serve purposes 
other than outbreak detection. For example, organisms suggesting foodborne illness or 
other outpatient issues (e.g., RSV) might not be worth investigating as a hospital-
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associated outbreak, but informing outpatient clinics of the rising prevalence in the 
general case mix might allow the clinics to more accurately diagnose or rapidly treat 
additional patients with similar symptoms.  
Algorithm Analysis: System Performance and Ranking in Developmental Study 
The lack of consensus regarding alerts generated by the four algorithms, and the 
excessive false positive rate for the parameter-adjusted EWMA system suggested that 
none of the four algorithms evaluated could solely provide a reliable alerting mechanism. 
Thus, to create a functionally useful MIASMA alerting system for hospital infection 
control purposes, some algorithmic combination technique that leveraged the relative 
strengths of each individual algorithm would likely provide the best overall system. In 
addition, based on the expert raters’ debriefing comments, some heuristic rules not 
present in any of the systems might beneficially impact the combined MIASMA system.  
Prior to the developmental study’s data analysis, the expert reviewers stated that 
performance goals for a useful generic outbreak detection system that infection control 
services might use in clinical practice. They stated that such a system would require at 
least 50% positive predictive value at 0.9 sensitivity, and at least 0.25 sensitivity at 75% 
positive predictive value. By ranking the combined list of clusters using the adjusted 
scoring metric and eliminating clusters with dissimilar antibiotic susceptibilities, the 
developmental study was able to achieve a 40% positive predictive value up to a 
sensitivity of 0.9 and a sensitivity of approximately 0.15 at a positive predictive value of 
75%. While these results did not attain the targeted performance levels, it suggested that 
further improvements might be able to reach the targeted levels of performance. By 
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incorporating the experts’ post-study advice and by addressing the developmental study’s 
limitations in the next MIASMA detection system design iteration, it might be possible to 
further reduce the false positive alerts while maintaining a good true positive detection 
rate and potentially reach the stated goals as described in the next chapter. 
 
Algorithm Analysis: Developmental Study Limitations 
The subjectivity of the review process led to an imperfect “gold standard” list of 
candidate outbreaks in the developmental study. The gold standard list could easily have 
missed some true outbreaks due to reviewer disagreement on what constituted a candidate 
cluster. Furthermore, the selection of algorithms for the study did not include the newest 
syndromic surveillance methods available by the end of the study88-90 and the parameter 
tuning required to implement each of the four algorithms may not have been optimal. The 
result was that true outbreak clusters in the developmental study may have been omitted 
from the algorithms’ output lists before ever being seen by the reviewers. That none of 
infection control service independently-verified outbreaks during the developmental 
study period appeared on the combined output list of the four algorithms suggests that 
suboptimal detection at the algorithmic level was likely a factor in the study. 
The culture results dataset used to generate the alerts also embodied potential 
methodological flaws. The developmental study used only the first result for a given 
organism/patient/unit combination in the dataset. While this approach prevented spurious 
alerts for multiple consecutive positive cultures on the same patient, it may have been too 
conservative overall. For example, a patient with E. coli cultures in January 2005 and 
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January 2006 would only be included in 2005, though it is unlikely that the patient’s 
infection lasted a full year. Additional errors may also arise from the system’s lack of 
information about changes within the hospital over time. For example, in late 2005 
(approximately halfway through the study period), the burn patient intensive care unit 
was relocated to another geographic ward, so new patient-organism-location clusters that 
previously would have been suppressed as duplicate cultures were not suppressed since 
they were reported from a “different” geographic unit. In addition, some clusters were 
simply a result of increased surveillance for certain organisms or an increase in a hospital 
unit’s size or number of patient-days as the study did not adjust for increases in patient-
bed-days.  
The adjustment for antibiotic sensitivity similarity was somewhat crude. For 
example, if an algorithm detected a cluster made up two distinct clones with widely 
differing sensitivities, the resulting average difference between the two could be large 
enough to eliminate the cluster from further consideration. Ideally, available antibiotic 
sensitivity data should have been included earlier in the detection process. 
Lastly, the performance of the system on retrospective datasets was not a 
guarantee of similar future performance. Because the review process was time consuming 
for the reviewers and the number of expected candidate outbreaks was limited, the 
resulting parameter adjustments have not been validated extensively. The “optimal” 
alerting thresholds determined in the developmental study may have been overfitted to 
the then-current data. Nevertheless, the six month retrospective evaluation demonstrated 
that the resulting system was able to detect all outbreaks confirmed by hospital infection 
control staff during that time period. 
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Algorithm Analysis: Conclusion 
 
The developmental study explored the potential for a syndromic-surveillance-
based approach to screening for potentially clonal inpatient infectious disease outbreaks. 
Each of the four aberrancy detection algorithms that the study examined had different 
performance characteristics that limited its individual applicability to the problem at 
hand. However, by combining the output from each algorithm and then sorting and 
filtering the possible clusters that the algorithms collectively identified -- based on 
additional heuristic data that the algorithms cannot easily incorporate -- the 
developmental study created a prototypic combined screening tool that demonstrated 
better potential to be clinically useful for hospital outbreak detection than any of the 
individual algorithms. Thus, while in-hospital outbreak surveillance presented different 
challenges than those faced by regional syndromic surveillance, the algorithms developed 
for syndromic surveillance might eventually be adapted to the inpatient screening setting. 
Further, more formal evaluation of such combined systems should occur.  
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CHAPTER IV 
PROSPECTIVE MIASMA STUDY OVERVIEW 
Prospective MIASMA Study Setting 
The project conducted a prospective study of the refined MIASMA algorithms 
previously described in Chapter III from November 2010 through April 2011 at 
Vanderbilt University using data from the Vanderbilt University Hospital, The Vanderbilt 
Clinic, and the Monroe Carell Jr. Children’s Hospital at Vanderbilt. The Vanderbilt 
Institutional Review Board approved the study design prior to its inception. The study 
team obtained data using MicroParse, the previously described (Chapter II) computer 
program that receives all microbiology reports from the Vanderbilt Medical Center 
microbiology laboratory via the electronic medical record system.  
Goals of Prospective MIASMA Evaluation 
Based on the observation that simple detection methods applied to hospital data 
had already shown promising results,13,91 the prospective MIASMA study began with the 
presumption that new, more advanced approaches to computer-assisted hospital infection 
control could potentially improve patient outcomes. By supplementing manual hospital 
infection control practices with an automated outbreak alerting system, the project 
attempted to achieve more rapid outbreak detection and more efficient alerting for 
outbreaks (i.e., fewer outbreaks missed with fewer “false positive” alerts that consume 
resources to investigate). 
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MIASMA System Design 
The prospective evaluation study team designed the final MIASMA algorithms 
based on lessons learned during the previous developmental study (Chapter III).87 As that 
research demonstrated that no single syndromic surveillance algorithm of the four tested 
provided adequate sensitivity, the final MIASMA version accepts positive culture count 
data and microbiology-related non-culture laboratory test results as input to all four 
developmental-stage algorithms. The final MIASMA algorithm also employs a rules 
engine in parallel with the four component algorithms to help generate a list of potential 
disease clusters and to then filter the list to heuristically remove clusters unlikely to 
correspond to a clonal outbreak. New potential clusters in the list are then added to 
MIASMA’s database to present to infection control staff for subsequent review. 
System Configuration: Prospective Study 
The process the MIASMA system followed during the study is summarized in 
Figure 9. Each day, the MIASMA system reviewed the past 180 days of microbiological 
test results (cultures and lab test results) of augmented MicroParse data (i.e., culture 
results plus microbiology-related laboratory test results tests for various organisms). Prior 
to sending the data to each of the four cluster detection algorithms (CUSUM, EWMA, 
SaTScan, and WSARE) and the rules engine, MIASMA preprocessed it to properly 
format the data for each algorithm as input. The MIASMA preprocessing also identified 
hospital inpatient unit groupings that could enable CUSUM and EWMA to locate 
outbreaks occurring in a related units that often shared staff and/or patients. 
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Based on the results of the Chapter III developmental study, and in an attempt to 
reduce false positive rates, the MIASMA study team modified the custom algorithms 
(CUSUM and EWMA) to increase the threshold needed to generate an alert. The study 
team also implemented a rules engine algorithm, based on a classification from local 
Infectious Disease experts of the likelihood of each type of organism to participate in a 
“significant” outbreak (a rough measure of how many patient-culture dyads might be 
needed to trigger a cluster alert). This heuristic approach helped to ensure that MIASMA 
would generate alerts in the case of a single positive culture for extremely virulent 
organisms (e.g., smallpox or anthrax) or for instances of unusually dangerous antibiotic 
susceptibility patterns (e.g., vancomycin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus) 
As in the developmental study, each MIASMA component algorithm returned a 
list of suspicious clusters of infections. Each cluster was characterized by an organism 
name, start and end dates, and a hospital location. Then MIASMA combined the list of 
results from each algorithm to create its daily “operating list” of clusters. Because the 
data each algorithm used each day largely overlapped with the data used in the previous 
179 days, the current day’s operating list typically contained a number of clusters 
MIASMA had already identified in an earlier execution. Thus, MIASMA would first 
compare the operating list to the database table containing the previously suspected 
clonal outbreaks. Duplicate entries were then linked to the existing database entry and 
dropped from the current day’s operating list. 
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MIASMA then calculated heuristic scores used to filter and rank each cluster. 
First, for clusters with antibiotic sensitivity information available, it calculated an 
antibiotic sensitivity similarity score as described previously in Chapter III. Clusters not 
meeting an empirically derived internal similarity cutpoint were then removed from the 
operating list. For example, if four E. coli cultures had widely disparate sensitivity 
patterns, the cluster containing them would be dropped due to presumed non-clonality. 
Next, MIASMA scored clusters using the EWMA-based metric described in Chapter III. 
MIASMA then assigns score weights according to the organism type by increasing the 
scores of clusters of more dangerous or virulent organisms and decreasing the scores for 
less pathogenic organisms and for organisms commonly resulting from contamination 
 
Figure 9: Summary of the process followed during daily MIASMA execution 
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during sample collection. At this point, clusters with scores below an empirically-derived 
score cutpoint are also excluded from the operating list. MIASMA then creates a new 
database entry for the current day for each remaining cluster. 
During the prospective evaluation period, on afternoon of the same day as specific 
cluster generation, MIASMA sent the ID/Infection Control expert an email summary of 
the daily additions to the database (if any) with a link to a password-protected supporting 
data review webpage. The review webpage listed all newly detected clusters with basic 
information about each, including the location in the hospital where the cluster occurred, 
the number of patients with positive microbiological results, and the start, end, and 
detection dates of the cluster. The MIASMA tracking web page also provided a text box 
for note entry and a dropdown box for each cluster, allowing the infection control expert, 
based on a deeper analysis of available data, to categorize the cluster as a probable 
hospital-based outbreak, a probable community-based outbreak, a pseudooutbreak, or a 
false alarm. Figure 10 displays a screenshot of the MIASMA cluster review webpage. 
 
Figure 10: Main view of MIASMA cluster review webpage 
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If the user desired more information about a cluster, each row on the review page 
contained a link that the reviewer could follow to a more detailed “drill-down” view of 
each cluster. The drill-down page included a summary of the antibiotic resistance patterns 
observed in the cluster, unit counts for house-wide clusters or clusters from a group of 
units, a graphical view of the weekly positive result counts, and the full text of all 
relevant microbiological results. See Figure 11 for an example of this display. 
 
Figure 11: Drill-down view from MIASMA cluster review webpage 
Prospective Pilot Study of MIASMA at VUMC 
To evaluate MIASMA’s utility as a supplement to traditional infection control 
practices, the project team implemented MIASMA in the Vanderbilt University Medical 
Center Department of Infection Control and Prevention. The evaluation study comprised 
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a two-phase rollout. In Phase 1, before general availability of the algorithm output, only 
the PI monitored MIASMA output to evaluate its detection timeliness; no alerts were 
issued to clinicians. In Phase 2, MIASMA was fully implemented as intended, with near 
real-time alerts to Infection Control clinicians. 
 The prospective Phase 2 MIASMA evaluation covered the six months spanning 
November 2010 through April 2011. During this period, MIASMA sent its daily email 
summaries to VUMC’s chief hospital epidemiologist for review and to the PI for 
evaluation study monitoring purposes. The chief hospital epidemiologist then used the 
MIASMA review webpage to gather basic information about any new clusters, 
investigate the clusters using the data available from the MIASMA review page and any 
other desired sources (e.g., the VUMC electronic medical record system or data collected 
by the VUMC infection preventionists), and then classify the clusters using the MIASMA 
review webpage. He reviewed each MIASMA alert on the day that it occurred and rated 
each as a false alarm, pseudo-outbreak, possible community outbreak, or possible 
nosocomial outbreak and could later revisit his determinations as more information 
became available. During the study period (late January 2011), MicroParse began to 
receive results from additional non-bacterial culture microbiological tests, including 
influenza and RSV testing. 
Data Analysis Methods – Prospective Evaluation 
The study team compared MIASMA’s timeliness and accuracy of detecting 
outbreaks to traditional infection control methods. During both phases of the prospective 
study, the study team recorded data for any clusters found by either manual methods or 
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by MIASMA (or by both). Nosocomial cluster detections vs. false alarm rates were 
compared for each pair of algorithms using a chi-squared test.  
For any outbreaks missed by MIASMA but detected by standard infection control 
methods, the study conducted a thorough investigation to determine the cause of 
MIASMA’s failure to alert. The study team located all implicated culture and test results 
to find whether they had been included in MIASMA’s input and investigated methods for 
locating any missing results. These included incorporating patient bed location data prior 
to the culture being taken, and methods for estimating when culture-negative cases might 
have occurred, based on patterns in physician order entry data. 
After observing the benefits of including patient bed location and transfer data in 
locating additional patients that might be part of a cluster, the study investigated the 
utility of incorporating such patient location and transfer data (i.e., a history of bed 
locations the patient occupied) within MIASMA. In this separate analysis, for each 
positive culture result, MIASMA retrieved any available patient bed location data from 5 
days prior to the positive result and added a “dummy” positive result for each bed 
location the patient had occupied at that time. The modified MIASMA algorithm then 
filtered duplicate positives, as it had done in normal operation, to prevent multiple 
counting of results for a single patient, which could skew results. MIASMA then ran 
twice on June 18, 2011: once with the standard data feed and once with the patient bed 
transfer data included.  
To investigate MIASMA’s performance at locating “expected” outbreaks, the 
study team analyzed its ability to detect seasonal illnesses (influenza A, influenza B, and 
RSV). The Tennessee State Department of Health publishes weekly positive test counts 
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for these illnesses. The study team compared the data collected by the Health Department 
to the data observed by MIASMA to roughly estimate how much of a timeliness 
advantage MIASMA could achieve since the normal rise of each illness mimics the 
pattern seen in an outbreak. 
Lastly, at the end of the prospective study period, the PI informally interviewed 
the chief epidemiologist to solicit his perception of the system’s performance and utility 
in everyday infection control practice. 
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS OF PROSPECTIVE MIASMA EVALUATION 
Alert Statistics 
During the 181-day prospective study period, MIASMA generated 78 alerts. On 
136 days, (75%) there were no alerts, and 36 days (20%) had one alert. Figure 12 
displays the complete data.  
 
MIASMA Alert Categorization 
Of the 78 alerts, the Infection Control expert rated 3 (4%) as possible nosocomial 
outbreaks, 51 (65%) as possible community outbreaks, 6 (8%) as pseudo-outbreaks, and 
18 (23%) as false alarms. Figure 13 displays the alerts generated each week as coded by 
the epidemiologist’s designation. Table 7 displays the counts for each designation by the 
Figure 12: Frequency of daily alert counts during MIASMA's 181-day study period 
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detecting algorithm. There were no significant pairwise differences among the four 
algorithms, though the comparison of WSARE to STSS was nearly significant in favor of 
WSARE (p=0.051). Table 8 provides a complete listing of all detected clusters during the 
study period. 
 
 
Figure 13: Weekly alerts generated by MIASMA during study period coded by expert 
designation 
Table 7: Cluster detection by algorithm and expert categorization 
  Nosocomial Community Pseudo False alarm 
CUSUM 0 12 0 0 
EWMA 0 0 0 3 
STSS 1 18 6 13 
WSARE 2 31 2 3 
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Table 8: Complete listing of detected clusters by affected site(s) and expert categorization 
during study period (Length given in days) 
Organism Unit Cases Length Expert Determination 
Enterococcus faecium 11NM 2 1 Nosocomial 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 8N 2 1 Nosocomial 
Haemophilus influenzae all 17 20 Nosocomial 
Streptococcus pyogenes ED/P 3 1 Community 
RSV all 6 21 Community 
Influenza virus type a all 85 27 Community 
Influenza virus type b all 125 28 Community 
RSV all 101 28 Community 
Influenza virus type a all 15 1 Community 
Influenza virus type a ED/P 6 1 Community 
Influenza virus type a EMER 7 1 Community 
RSV ED/P 12 1 Community 
RSV ED/P 9 1 Community 
Influenza virus type a ED/P 3 1 Community 
RSV ED/P 9 1 Community 
Influenza virus type a ED/P 5 1 Community 
Influenza virus type a all 8 1 Community 
Streptococcus pyogenes ED/P 15 1 Community 
Influenza virus type b ED/P 9 1 Community 
Influenza virus type b all 8 1 Community 
Influenza virus type b EMER 2 1 Community 
Influenza virus type b ED/P 5 1 Community 
RSV ED/P 6 1 Community 
Influenza virus type b all 6 1 Community 
RSV ED/P 3 1 Community 
Influenza virus type b ED/P 2 1 Community 
Streptococcus pyogenes ED/P 17 1 Community 
Influenza virus type b EMER 3 1 Community 
RSV all 105 28 Community 
Influenza virus type a all 97 28 Community 
RSV ED/P 11 1 Community 
RSV all 105 27 Community 
Influenza virus type a all 3 1 Community 
Influenza virus type a ED/P 7 1 Community 
Influenza virus type a all 95 28 Community 
RSV all 117 28 Community 
Influenza virus type a all 100 27 Community 
RSV all 122 28 Community 
RSV ED/P 12 1 Community 
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Table 8 (continued): Complete listing of detected clusters by affected site(s) and expert 
categorization during study period (Length given in days) 
Organism Unit Cases Length Expert Determination 
Influenza virus type b all 122 28 Community 
RSV all 111 21 Community 
Influenza virus type a all 11 1 Community 
Streptococcus pyogenes ED/P 177 44 Community 
Streptococcus pyogenes ED/P 206 53 Community 
Influenza virus type a all 108 27 Community 
Influenza virus type a all 112 27 Community 
Influenza virus type a ED/P 4 1 Community 
Influenza virus type a ED/P 7 1 Community 
Influenza virus type a EMER 2 1 Community 
RSV all 149 27 Community 
RSV all 157 28 Community 
RSV ED/P 196 43 Community 
Influenza virus type a ED/P 61 30 Community 
RSV ED/P 268 72 Community 
Lactobacillus species all 36 25 Pseudo 
Lactobacillus species all 42 28 Pseudo 
Acid-fast bacillus all 2 2 Pseudo 
Bacteroides thetaiotaomicron all 2 1 Pseudo 
Lactobacillus species all 11 2 Pseudo 
Streptococcus pneumoniae all 11 7 Pseudo 
Coag-negative Staphylococcus PBIL 2 2 False alarm 
Coag-negative Staphylococcus 7C 2 7 False alarm 
Enterobacter aerogenes all 15 15 False alarm 
Burkholderia cepacia all 2 2 False alarm 
Lactobacillus species EMER 2 1 False alarm 
Gram positive cocci all 6 4 False alarm 
Trichophyton rubrum all 4 15 False alarm 
Epstein Barr virus all 8 6 False alarm 
Diphtheroids species all 12 4 False alarm 
Chlamydia trachomatis all 13 2 False alarm 
Aspergillus fumigatus all 5 9 False alarm 
Streptococcus intermedius all 4 4 False alarm 
Candida species all 4 2 False alarm 
Hepatitis C all 40 23 False alarm 
Citrobacter koseri all 8 8 False alarm 
Coag-negative Staphylococcus OVUH 2 1 False alarm 
Enterococcus species all 10 17 False alarm 
Gram positive ADL2 3 1 False alarm 
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Comparison of MIASMA Output to Manual Methods 
During both phases of the prospective evaluation study, there was no overlap in 
suspected bacterial cluster identification between MIASMA and the traditional infection 
control methods. Thus, no direct comparisons measuring timeliness of detection could 
occur. 
Comparison of MIASMA Output to Public Health Records for Seasonal Illnesses 
The Tennessee State Department of Health publishes weekly positive test counts 
for influenza A and influenza B. Figure 14A shows the retrospective graph published by 
the TN Department of Health on May 7, 2011.92 Figure 14B shows a comparable graph 
generated from MIASMA’s source data with dates marked when MIASMA generated at 
least 1 alert. Figure 15 shows data from the same time period for RSV. State data for 
RSV were not available because the testing instrument used at the state labs was being 
serviced. 
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Figure 14: Comparison of TN State Department of Health and VUMC influenza results, 2010-
2011. MIASMA alerts generated during weeks marked with bold border. 
 
A 
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Investigation of Potential Outbreaks During Prospective Study Period Missed by 
MIASMA 
During the prospective study period, a single outbreak confirmed by the Infection 
Control Service occurred. It was an outbreak of Clostridium difficile associated with 
patients who had been housed previously on S44, a general surgery unit. Infection control 
staff located a total of 12 suspected patients with C. difficile during a 1 month span, with 
6 culture-positive cases and 6 clinically diagnosed cases, some of whom had negative 
culture results. Investigation of the MIASMA dataset identified 4 of the 6 culture-positive 
results on the affected unit. Locating the remaining 2 culture-positive patients required 
 
Figure 15: RSV positive tests at VUMC during study period. MIASMA alerts generated during 
weeks marked with bold border. 
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the incorporation of a separate database containing patient bed location information, as 
the patients had been moved to new bed locations prior to their positive culture results. 
Figure 16A shows the overall C. difficile incidence. Overall, the incidence during the 
month increased by slightly over 1 additional positive culture per week during the 
outbreak period (1.25/week during the outbreak period vs. 0.11/week normally). 
Since some of the implicated patients were culture-negative, the PI also explored 
the effects of including tests negative for C. difficile as a “partial positive” test since a 
physician presumably ordered the test suspecting potential C. difficile infection. Figure 
16B shows the results of including negative tests as ¼ of a positive test. When using the 
weighted score, the increase during the outbreak period was slightly over 1 positive test 
per week greater than the non-outbreak periods (1.75/week during the outbreak period vs 
0.57 normally). 
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Figure 16: Test result data from Clostridium difficile in S44 
 
Located using 
patient transfer data 
A 
B 
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Incorporating Patient Bed Location and Transfer Data 
The patient bed transfer-enriched dataset was approximately 25% larger than the 
standard dataset. Overall, the algorithms found 90 clusters on the standard data and 89 
using the bed transfer data. However, the clusters found using each dataset were quite 
different: 46 clusters were found using both datasets, while 44 were found using the 
standard dataset only and 43 using the transfer-enriched dataset only. 
Of the 90 clusters found using the standard dataset, 61 were filtered using the 
standard MIASMA suppression techniques previously described and were never viewed 
by the epidemiologist; the remaining 29 were duplicates of previously detected clusters. 
Those 29 consisted of 20 community outbreaks, 7 false alarms, and 2 pseudooutbreaks. 
When using the transfer data, MIASMA no longer detected 11 of the community 
outbreaks, 2 of the false alarms, or either of the pseudo-outbreaks. A chi-square test 
showed no difference between the designations of the clusters detected using both 
datasets versus the standard dataset alone (p=0.326). 
Expert Assessment of MIASMA System 
VUMC’s chief epidemiologist stated that MIASMA was best described a “safety 
net:” it would not be able to replace regular surveillance, but it did provide a backup to 
help prevent standard practices from missing potential outbreaks. Furthermore, 
MIASMA’s increased activity during influenza and RSV season provided an unexpected 
value to the chief epidemiologist as these data helped inform institutional policies that 
were implemented once the community incidence of these infections had increased. 
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These data also helped guide clinicians regarding probability of these infections in 
patients presenting with respiratory symptoms. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION OF PROSPECTIVE MIASMA EVALUATION 
MIASMA Alert Quality 
From the chief epidemiologist’s feedback, the volume of the alerts was deemed 
reasonable in terms of workload, with only alerts occurring only 1 day in every 4. In 
addition, there were no more than two false alarms or pseudo-outbreaks in any given 
week. This helped prevent alert fatigue. Of note, during late January and early February, 
the alerts were dominated by clusters of community-based seasonal illnesses (influenza, 
RSV, and Group A Streptococcus). The volume of alerts could easily be reduced by more 
restrictive methods of eliminating duplicate clusters. For example, in this study, by only 
allowing one alert for a given unit/organism combination in a given month if the first 
cluster is deemed to be community-based, MIASMA would have generated only 37 
alerts, fewer than half of the 78 actually generated during the study.  
On one day (1/29/2011), MIASMA generated 22 of the 78 alerts based on cluster 
detections made primarily by WSARE. This anomaly was the result of corrections made 
to the underlying culture reporting data. Previously, influenza antigen tests, RSV antigen 
tests, and Group A Streptococcus probes were not properly included in the MIASMA 
input data. Once those test results were incorporated into MIASMA’s input dataset, 
WSARE detected clusters of each of these pathogens though all hospital wards and in the 
pediatric and adult emergency departments. 
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Unfortunately, MIASMA could not locate the only Infection Control Service 
confirmed outbreak during the study period. Since half of the patients involved in that 
outbreak were located by the infection preventionists only based on a clinical 
symptomatic diagnosis of Clostridium difficile, MIASMA’s lab-and-culture-based 
approach was at a disadvantage. Observing the incidence of C. difficile in S44 over time, 
there was clearly an increase of positive tests during the month of the outbreak. However, 
the increase was only slight (approximately 1 additional positive test result per week), 
and if the detection algorithms were set to be sensitive enough to detect such a cluster, 
the number of false positive alerts for other organisms would likely increase. Similarly, if 
one were to incorporate the negative C. difficile tests as partial positives, one would 
observe a similar small increase over the baseline, but the increase would not be 
sufficient to trigger an alert from any of the algorithms. 
One alternative method of detecting such a cluster would be to expand the 
MIASMA rules engine to make better use of domain knowledge. During the study, 
MIASMA simply used the rules engine to alert in the event of a single positive culture for 
extremely virulent organisms (e.g., smallpox or anthrax) or unusually dangerous 
antibiotic susceptibility patterns (e.g., vancomycin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus). 
However, the engine could very easily trigger an alert for any desired incidence 
threshold. For example, the outbreak in question could have been located by firing an 
alert any time 4 or more positive C. difficile tests occur on any specific unit within a 2 
week period. By incorporating this and similar rules as suggested by the chief 
epidemiologist, MIASMA could potentially detect additional relevant clusters without 
adding many false alarms. 
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Algorithm Performance During the Prospective MIASMA Study 
None of the algorithms were significantly better than the others, though it might 
have been possible to show that WSARE outperformed STSS if the study had used a 
larger sample size. A borderline significant difference was observed, as noted. The study 
was insufficiently powered to find a difference of such a small magnitude. Nevertheless, 
this result supports the finding from Chapter III showing that no one of the implemented 
component surveillance algorithms was able to sufficiently detect all desirable clusters in 
this problem domain. 
Because the two custom-implemented algorithms (i.e., “tuneable” parameters 
were specifically adjusted by the study team for EWMA and CUSUM) could be scaled 
back to prevent excessive alert generation, they were much less prolific in generating 
alerts than were WSARE and STSS (3 and 12 alerts for EWMA and CUSUM 
respectively vs. 38 each for WSARE and STSS). However, this may not have been ideal, 
as CUSUM identified only community outbreaks during the study and EWMA only false 
alarms, suggesting that the filtering rules MIASMA applied to reduce the number of 
alerts generated by these two algorithms may not have been effective at “distilling” the 
signal from the noise within them. 
Though newer scan statistic algorithms than STSS have been developed,67-70 their 
focus is primarily on making the STSS spatial detection methods more flexible. Since this 
study used spatial information in the form of hospital unit groupings that were based on 
staff and patient movement rather than geographic spatial information, however, the 
newer algorithmic improvements probably would not be useful. Thus, as STSS has been 
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much more extensively used and validated than newer algorithms, it was likely an 
adequate or better choice for MIASMA than one of the newer algorithms. 
Seasonal Detection Performance 
The community-based clusters for which MIASMA generated alerts tended to 
serve as noise when trying to detect hospital-based outbreaks. However, information 
about the community influenza and RSV incidence proved useful to VUMC’s chief 
epidemiologist as noted above. The previously mentioned methods of eliminating the 
excess alerts might have diminished this unexpected MIASMA benefit. Furthermore, it is 
clear from this study that MIASMA cannot replace infection control staff, but it can 
likely provide a valuable supplement to make surveillance efforts more comprehensive. 
Thus, it may not be desirable to remove the influenza and RSV alerts. 
Comparing MIASMA’s influenza data to the TN State Department of Health 
shows that MIASMA achieved an approximately 1 week lead time in detection versus the 
State Department of Health on the initial rise in influenza. Initial MIASMA influenza 
alerts occurred very early. Coupled with the fact that the State Department of Health only 
issues reports once weekly, MIASMA had in effect up to a 2 week advantage in 
identifying the start of influenza season.  
Adding Patient Bed Location Data to MIASMA 
Incorporating historical patient bed location data into MIASMA’s input stream 
had an unexpectedly large effect on the resulting clusters detected. Prior to testing the 
system with the bed location data included, the study team expected to simply see the 
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same clusters as with the standard non-dynamic bed data with possibly a few additional 
detected clusters since the transfer dataset contained all the same results plus the extra 
data resulting from the prior bed locations. However, some clusters also disappeared after 
adding bed locations. Presumably, this effect resulted from an increase in the baseline 
rates of infection in some units. This increase could subsequently make the spike of 
infections during the previously detected cluster appear less abnormal. The clusters 
eliminated by including the patient transfer data were not significantly different by 
designation, however, so it seems unlikely that incorporating the transfer data significant 
improved the quality of the generated alerts unless the newly added clusters were 
particularly likely to be deemed outbreaks. A larger data sample encompassing longer 
observation periods is necessary to determine objectively what utility the dynamic patient 
location data might add to MIASMA. 
Other methods of incorporating dynamic bed location information might improve 
the overall performance. For example, incorporating information about incubation times 
and contagious periods for individual pathogens would allow MIASMA to be more 
discriminating in retrieving relevant patient bed location data for only the times when a 
given patient would likely have contracted the disease or when he or she could pass the 
disease on to others. 
Expert Assessment of MIASMA’s Performance and Utility 
As the volume of cultures and lab tests conducted during clinical practice grows, 
MIASMA’s functionality as a potential safety net increases in importance. The role of 
VUMC infection preventionists (IPs) has recently shifted from looking at all cultures 
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serially to a more specialized approach where each IP is responsible for cultures that fall 
under a common rubric (e.g., only reviewing bloodstream infections in catheterized 
patients). This specialized model thus makes it more likely that the IPs might miss an 
outbreak that does not fall into one of the predetermined categories. The current 
prospective study thus corroborates past findings regarding automated surveillance for 
outbreaks in the hospital setting91 that found that with whole-house surveillance 
becoming less practical for large hospitals, automated surveillance can provide a useful 
supplement to standard practice. 
The MIASMA study delivered an unexpected benefit through the information 
gained by the frequent alerts for influenza and RSV. In past years, RSV and influenza 
data were not routinely collected by the IPs to be passed on to the chief epidemiologist. 
Thus, he had not been able to provide advice on the timing of such epidemics to inquiring 
clinicians. However, with MIASMA regularly keeping him informed of the influenza and 
RSV activity within the hospital, emergency departments, and clinics, he was able to give 
accurate and timely information. 
MIASMA System Portability 
The PI plans to make MIASMA and the custom implementations of the public 
domain EWMA and CUSUM algorithms freely available for not-for-profit use under a 
Simplified BSD license (or FreeBSD license).93 The MIASMA algorithms require only a 
PHP installation to run. The WSARE and STSS implementations are available from their 
original authors under free use licenses. However, as they are only available as binaries, 
they can only be used on platforms for which their original authors have compiled them. 
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Thus, STSS is available via the SaTScan download page94 for Windows, Max OSX, and 
Linux, and WSARE is available from Carnegie Mellon University’s Auton Lab download 
page95 for Windows and Linux only. For other platforms, users can easily configure 
MIASMA to exclude any unusable component algorithms. 
Currently, MIASMA is configured to work with the MicroParse MySQL database 
only. However, the code that queries the database is separated from the program logic, 
allowing users to relatively easily modify those portions of the system. Because 
MIASMA’s requirements for data structuring are relatively simple, only requiring a list 
of positive cultures labeled with name, date, and location, it is relatively easy to adapt the 
system to other database engines (e.g., PostgreSQL or Oracle) and schemas. The database 
tables containing the hospital unit groupings and organism names would need to be 
modified to reflect the local nomenclature to make use of all of MIASMA’s features, 
however. 
MIASMA Prospective Study Limitations 
The largest limitation of the pilot prospective MIASMA study was the small 
number of outbreaks (one) that occurred during the study period. Ideally, the study could 
have been conducted across multiple sites and for a longer duration to allow MIASMA to 
detect more outbreaks of differing types. With only a single “true” outbreak occurring, 
and in that instance, with half of the implicated patients being culture-negative, it was 
difficult to definitively determine whether MIASMA was truly useful in practice. 
On a related note, the dearth of true outbreaks made comparing MIASMA’s 
performance to that of manual methods on timeliness and accuracy infeasible. Again, this 
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could have been solved by conducting the study across multiple sites for a longer time. 
That would allow the study to find situations where both MIASMA and the local 
infection control staff detected the same outbreaks. Extending the study would also allow 
better evaluation of techniques for locating the Clostridium difficile outbreak missed 
during the study period.  
With the potential for patient bed location transfer data to be useful adjunct 
information to MIASMA’s constituent algorithms, further analysis of the impact of 
incorporating bed location transfer data could help strengthen the MIASMA system. 
Ideally, a new study would have mirrored the prospective study design using bed location 
transfer data and had all resulting clusters classified by an expert. The end result would 
be a complete picture of how the detected clusters compared using each of the datasets 
and a much clearer idea of the effects of including patient bed location data. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SYNOPSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
The MIASMA project developed, deployed and evaluated MIASMA, a system 
that uses recently developed methods (e.g., from syndromic surveillance and from 
heuristic observations) to detect single-hospital outbreaks of both commonly occurring 
and rare bacterial species. Because there were relatively few outbreaks during the study 
period, further research would be necessary to determine the degree to which MIASMA 
assisted hospital staff. However, MIASMA successfully supplemented VUMC’s standard 
hospital outbreak detection practices.  
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